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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS*-In 1881, the United
States Supreme Court expressed the prevailing theory that the powers of govern-
ment should be distributed into three distinct departments and that one de-
partment should not be permitted to exercise any power belonging to another.'
This separation of powers theory conflicts with the practice of many modern
administrative agencies which exercise both legislative and judicial powers.2
Any conflict between the complete separation of powers theory and an actual
agency's practice reaches the court as a constitutional issue since the federal and
most state constitutions provide for separation of powers either implicitly3 or ex-
plicitly. 4 Where the constitutional provision is not explicit, courts have resolved
the conflict by interpreting separation of powers to merely mean that the whole
power of one governmental branch cannot be exercised by any group having the
whole power of another branch. 5 Using this approach, courts have allowed agen-
cies to combine governmental powers. 6 But, the problem of reconciling the con-
stitutional mandate with the practical need for allowing agencies to use more
than one power is much more difficult in a state with an explicit constitutional
provision for complete separation of powers. This was the problem before
the New Mexico Supreme Court in Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation
Comm'n.
7
In Continental, an order of the Oil Conservation Commission" which
changed the proration formula used in the Jalmat Pool from one based on
pure acreage to one including a deliverability factor was in issue. The district
court, upon review of the order, admitted new evidence, and affirmed the Com-
mission's order. On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Mexico, held, Re-
versed with directions to declare the orders of the Commission invalid and void.
The district court should not have admitted new evidence because those pro-
visions of the appeal statute9 allowing the court to consider new evidence or
*.Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
1. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881).
2. Davis, Administrative Law Text § 1.09 (1959).
3. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1.
4. See e.g., Idaho Const. art. 2, § 1; Iowa Const. art. 3, § 1; Mont. Const. art. 4,
§ 1; Miss. Const. art. 1, § 1; N.M. Const. art. 3, § 1.
5. See, e.g., Bailey v. Board of Pub. Affairs, 194 Okla. 495, 153 P.2d 235 (1944) ; see
generally, Hamilton, Madison & Jay, The Federalist, No. XLVII at 246 (Everyman's
Library ed. 1948).
6. Ibid.
7. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
8. There were two orders involved. Order No. R-1092-C with only one minor change
affirmed Order No. R-1092-A. Since the court treats the validity of Order No.
R-1092-A as the only practical issue, this comment also refers to "an order" rather
than "the orders." See Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310,
373 P.2d 809 (1962).
9. "The trial upon appeal shall be de novo. . . .The court shall determine the
issues of fact and of law and shall, upon a preponderance of the evidence ...which
allowing a trial de novo are unconstitutional under Article III, Section 1 of
the New Mexico Constitution.
Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution reads as follows:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted. (Emphasis
added.)
The supreme court interpreted this language to mean that courts can not
perform legislative functions. 10 The supreme court also stated that the pro-
tection of oil and gas correlative rights is a legislative function which may be
delegated to the Oil Conservation Commission." In view of these conclu-
sions, the statutory provisions 12 for trial de novo and admission of new evi-
dence logically had to be declared unconstitutional. If a trial de novo is allowed
or new evidence is admitted, the court must necessarily substitute its discre-
tion for that of the Commission. The court, in effect, would be exercising a
legislative function. This would contravene Article III, Section 1 as interpreted
by the supreme court.
This decision that a de novo review of an administrative order is unconsti-
tutional is another step in the development of the separation of powers doc-
trine in New Mexico. In 1913 the supreme court considered a statute13
which provided for a de novo review when an order of the State Engineer
was in issue.14 The court said that the statute contemplated a hearing or trial
de novo and not a review of the agency order. More recent decisions, how-
ever, reflect a trend towards complete separation of powers and away from
de novo review. In Yarbrough v. Montoya'5 a statute'0 providing for de novo
review of decisions by the Liquor Control Division Chief was interpreted. The
supreme court said that a hearing de novo required only that the decision
be examined to see if it was contrary to the evidence, unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious. While the de novo provision was not declared unconstitutional, de
may include evidence in addition to the transcript of proceedings before the com-
mission. . . ." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-22(b) (1953).
10. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
11. Id. at 318, 373 P.2d at 814.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-22(b) (1953).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).
14. Farmers Dev. Co. v. Rayado Land & Irr. Co., 18 N.M. 1, 133 Pac. 104 (1913).
Contra, Kelley v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist. & Reynolds, 379 P.2d 763 (N.M. 1963).
15. 54 N.M. 91, 214 P.2d 769 (1950).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 46-5-16 (1953).
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novo was defined in such a way that the provision lost most of its effectiveness.
Where there is no de novo statutory provision, the court has long used the
"unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious" test when reviewing orders of an
agency. 17 In Yarbrough"s the same test was used even though the statute'" did
provide for a de novo review. In Spencer v. Bliss20 the court was not required
to rule on the constitutionality of the statutory provision 2' for a de novo
hearing. But the dictum 23 clearly indicates that the court, had it been necessary,
would have either declared the provision unconstitutional or, in spite of the
de novo provision, limited the scope of review to questions of law and to
determining whether the State Engineer acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or
capriciously.
2 3
State ex. rel. Hovey Concrete Products Co. v. Mechem,24 decided in 1957,
is a landmark case in the development of the separation of powers doctrine. The
Mechem25 court found that Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico constitu-
tion requires complete separation of governmental powers, that under Article
VI, Section 1 of the constitution the legislative branch is not authorized to decide
questions of fact in order to adjudicate disputes between private litigants, and
that a department of government can exercise only those powers specifically au-
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960) ; Garrett Freight
Lines v. Corporation Comm'n, 63 N.M. 48, 312 P. 2d 1061 (1957).
18. 54 N.M. 91,214 P.2d 769 (1950).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. §46-5-16 (1953).
20. 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
21. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953).
22. Spencer v. Bliss, 60 N.M. 16, 287 P.2d 221 (1955).
23. Very recently the court did consider N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953), in Kelley
v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist. & Reynolds, 379 P.2d 763 (N.M. 1963). The supreme court's first
opinion, dated Feb. 7, 1963 said:
[W]e conclude that the term de noqo as used in § 75-6-1 . . . does not permit
the district court . . . to hear new or additional evidence . . . the court is
limited to . . . the legal evidence produced at the hearing before the state
engineer, and to deterrhining whether his action was fraudulent, arbitrary or
capricious; was substantially supported by the evidence; whether there are
errors of law; and, whether the action was within the scope of the state
engineer's authority.
The court withdrew the first opinion and substituted a second opinion dated March
15, 1963 which revised the above quote to read:
[W]e conclude that § 75-6-1 . . . does not permit the district court . . . to
hear new or additional evidence. . . . The review . . . is limited to questions
of law and restricted to whether, based upon the legal evidence produced at
the hearing before the state engineer, that officer acted fraudulently, arbitrarily
or capriciously; whether his action was substantially supported by the evidence;
or, whether the action was within the scope of the state engineer's authority.
The second opinion also included a new paragraph which said that the State Engineer
was acting in an administrative capacity and not making judicial determinations. This
was implied in the first opinion but not expressly stated.
24. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
25. Ibid.
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thorized by the constitution. The court considered the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act 26 of 1957 as an act purporting to authorize an administrative agency to
decide questions of fact in order to adjudicate disputes between private parties.
Therefore, a large part of the act 27 was declared unconstitutional as an improper
delegation of judical power to a legislative agency.
The Continental28 case makes it clear that the judiciary can not exercise
legislative powers. The Mechem 29 case makes it clear that an administrative
agency will not be allowed to exercise judicial powers. Theoretically under the
complete separation of powers doctrine, each function can be classified as legis-
lative or judicial. Once this is accomplished, the solution to a separation of
powers problem becomes mechanical. 'In reality, however, in a modern, com-
plex society many governmental tasks cannot be easily assigned to only one of
the traditional categories. And, from a practical standpoint, many tasks can
not be adequately performed using the powers of only one branch of govern-
ment. Administrative agencies were developed as a practical means of per-
forming governmental tasks requiring the exercise of more than one power.
New Mexico needs the expert services of such agencies, but the supreme court
is handicapped by the explicit language in Article III, Section 1 of the
constitution.
Although the court in Continental0 was careful to maintain formal com-
pliance with the complete separation of powers theory, the case can be inter-
preted to mean that the Oil Conservation Commission is, in fact, authorized to
adjudicate private disputes. If this interpretation is correct, then Continental3'
may be a slight retreat from the Mechem3 2 extreme separation of powers
doctrine.
Legislation preventing or prohibiting waste is a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power, and the power to make fact determinations to which the
law is to be applied may be delegated to the Oil Conservation Commission. 3
In Continental3 4 the court concluded that the protection of correlative rights
is a legislative function since, in the court's view, correlative rights and waste
are inseparable. But, in fact, correlative rights and waste can be considered
separate issues. To illustrate this, it is necessary to recognize the difference be-
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-10-38, to -125 (1953) (now unconstitutional).
27. Ibid.
28. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
29. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
30. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
31. Ibid.
32. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
33. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 318, 373 P.2d
809, 814 (1962) ; accord, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) ; F. C. Henderson,
Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 56 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1932); Shannon v. Shaffer Oil &
Ref. Co., 51 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1931).
34. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
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tween proration and the proration formula. Proration is based upon the econo-
mic waste concept.35 The public has an interest, under the economic waste con-
cept, in fixing the maximum amount of production to be allowed from each
field in the state in accordance with market demand.30 Proration is the term
used when each field's allowable is set. The proration formula governs how a
particular field's allowable is to be divided among the individual owners of the
field. The public has no recognized interest in how the allowable is shared by
the co-owners of a field, as long as the formula used does not introduce waste.
A dispute involving two formulas, neither of which would introduce waste,
is of concern only to the owners of the field. The Commission is authorized to
decide such a dispute on the basis of each owner's correlative right to have an
opportunity to take his equitable share of the common reservoir.3 7 When the
Commission does decide such a dispute, as it did in the Continental38 case, it is
deciding a controversy between rival claimants to interests in property. Under
the Mechem"0 rationale such a procedure is an exercise of judicial power.
Therefore, it should follow that the Commission cannot issue orders based
solely on correlative rights. In the past, a few courts have found that agency
orders based solely on correlative rights are invalid as unconstitutional delega-
tions of judicial power.40 However, today in most jurisdictions a commission
is allowed to issue such orders.41 The Continental court said that waste is an
35. Proration must be distinguished from the MER which is the maximum efficient
recovery ratio. MER is the maximum rate of production from a well consistent with
maximum ultimate recovery from the producing structure. Its primary purpose is to
conserve reservoir energy so that the energy will be used in the most efficient manner.
It is not analogous to the time-rate-of-use concept applicable to conservation of other
types of resources. The time-rate-of-use principle applies where there is a reasonable
replacement cycle. Thus, in the case of timber, the idea is to cut timber at a rate
which allows the forest to replenish itself. If timber is cut too rapidly, erosion can
spoil the area and completely interrupt the timber replacement cycle. There is no
replacement cycle in the case of oil and gas, for all practical purposes. Therefore,
the only reason to limit the rate of recovery is to use the reservoir energy most
efficiently (MER) and to keep the supply in line with market demand (proration).
Production in excess of market demand is considered to be economic waste. While
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-13 (1953) gives the Commission authority to limit production
to prevent physical waste as well as economic waste, in practice field production is
limited on the basis of market demand, i.e., economic waste, except where the demand
is very large and the MER sets an upper limit on production. See, Oil Conservation
Comm'n, Rules & Regulations, Rule 503 (c) (1961).
36. See, e.g., Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 5 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.
Tex. 1934) ; Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-10 (1953).
38. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
39. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
40. E.g., Consolidated Gas Util. Corp. v. Thompson, 14 F.Supp. 318, 327 (W.D. Tex.
1936).
41. E.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Sterling Oil & Ref. Co., 147 Tex. 547, 218 S.W.2d 415
(1949).
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integral part of the definition of correlative rights. 42 But, the words without
waste used in the definition 43 can be interpreted as a means of fixing the
priority between the two duties assigned to the Commission rather than an
integral part of the correlative rights definition. The Commission's first and
paramount duty is to prevent waste.4 4 After this duty is performed, the Com-
mission is then authorized to protect correlative rights. Using this reasoning,
waste is not only separable from correlative rights, but whenever the Com-
mission properly reaches a correlative rights issue, it has to be the last and,
therefore, only issue. It is true that without all the Commission's rules and
regulations designed to prevent waste, correlative rights could not be pro-
tected. 45 In view of the dependence of correlative rights protection upon the
other duties of the Commission, it would be impractical, but not impossible, to
use the judicial system to protect correlative rights. 46 This dependence upon
prior commission actions is probably what the court had in mind when it said
that waste was inseparable from correlative rights. Another strong reason for
permitting the Commission to decide correlative rights disputes is that settle-
ment of such disputes is pecularily dependent upon specialized judgment. It
takes experts to properly decide these controversies and the court was reluc-
42. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
43. (h) "Correlative rights" means the opportunity afforded, so far as it is
practicable to do so, to the owner of each property in a pool to produce with-
out waste his just and equitable share of the oil or gas, or both, in the pool,
being an amount, so far as can be practicably determined, and so far as can
be practicably obtained without waste, substantially in the proportion that the
quantity of recoverable oil or gas, or both, under such property bears to the
total recoverable oil or gas, or both, in the pool, and for such purpose to use
his just and equitable share of the reservoir energy. [Emphasis added.]
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 65-3-29(h) (1953).
44. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
45. The correlative right of an owner to have the opportunity to take his pro-rata
share of the oil in a common reservoir is not protected under the common law. Pro-
tection of this right is only available under the conservation statutes. Cribbet, Fritz &
Johnson, Property, 1049 (1960).
46. Consider the hypothetical case where A and B are co-owners of a gas field.
They disagree as to how the total recoverable gas should be shared. Under the com-
mon law, the "rule of capture" would prevail and each could produce as much gas
as possible, even if one or the other succeeds in taking a disproportionate share by
draining gas from under the property of the other. But, under the conservation
statutes, means are available to protect an owner's interest in his in situ gas. The Com-
mission exercises the state's police power to issue orders preventing physical waste
(e.g., well-spacing, operating procedures). To prevent economic waste, the field allow-
able is fixed. A and B would have to submit their formulas governing how the allow-
able should be shared to the Commission. The Commission would then certify that
neither formula would introduce waste. Now the controversy is private and the court
could decide the dispute. But it would be unreasonable and impractical to have the
court enter the situation at this point. It is much better to allow the Commission to
decide the dispute since the Commission has to do so much before the matter can be
adjudicated.
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tant to substitute "its discretion for that of the expert administrative body."'47
The court's rationale is understandable since it is a reasonable way to reconcile
the practicalities of the situation with Article III, Section 1 of the constitution
and with the extreme separation of powers doctrine expressed in lechem.
48
The Continental49 decision along with other recent decisions 50 indicate
that the court will not allow de novo review of administrative orders. When
a statutory provision for de novo review is in issue, the court will probably
either declare the provision unconstitutional 51 or, in spite of the de novo pro-
vision, limit the scope of review to questions of law and to determining whether
the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, or capriciously.52 The Continental'
decision may also indicate that the extreme position taken in Mechem5 4 will
be relaxed to allow an agency to adjudicate a private dispute whose settlement
requires specialized knowledge and experience and can be best handled by the
agency as part of its overall purpose.
THOMAS A. GARRITY
47. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
48. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
49. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
50. E.g., Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962) ; Kelley v. Carlsbad
Irr. Dist. & Reynolds, 379 P.2d 763 (N.M. 1963).
51. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
52. E.g., Heine v. Reynolds, 69 N.M. 398, 367 P.2d 708 (1962) ; Kelley v. Carlsbad
Irr. Dist. & Reynolds 379 P.2d 763 (N.M. 1963).
53. 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809 (1962).
54. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
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